I'm going to preface this that I'll be downvoting any answers or comments that go after specific community members. I know question closure is a contentious topic but I think both the asker and close-voters here are acting in good faith. I'd encourage people to do the same.
This question was closed as "needs details or clarity". I think it should be reopened. The original question was clear:
So [bayesian degrees of belief] seem to match degree of belief with actual actions taken in the form of bets. For example, one can claim that they have a 20% credence in God. By the framework mentioned above, this means that they would bet 0.2 units on a bet that pays off 1 unit if they’re right and 0 if they lose.
But given that this situation is merely considered as a hypothetical, and that this kind of bet (for the most part) doesn’t actually take place, how do we know what we would bet on? If we can’t, how do we know what our actual degree of belief in a proposition is in the first place?
In any case, it has now been edited to:
So there seems to be two possible ways we assess degree of belief: with the mathematics that lies behind odds, and with actual actions taken in the form of bets. So, in any given situation the odds are merely considered a hypothetical since unless a bet actually is made, we don't know what we believe if haven't decided to bet, right? If we don’t bet, do we know what our actual degree of belief in a proposition is in the first place?
Both of these phrasings are, I think, clear and answerable. Answers have a wealth of relevant sources to reference, e.g. bayesian epistemological arguments about Dutch books, etc.
Here are the objections raised against it:
You ask: "how do we know what our actual degree of belief in a proposition is in the first place?" - If you yourself do not know how firm your belief is, how shall an external source find the answer for you?
Can we know that we saw red yesterday, and it was the same red that we see today. After all, we cannot actually time travel and verify it. And as we trust our memory, faulty though it is, we'll just have to trust our imagination to let ourselves know how we would hypothetically behave, as we do in any planning. And yes, we may guess wrong, as with everything else, and/or our bet may change when it comes to making it. Italicizing and adding "actually" do not do the work you expect of them.
I don't want to be facetious or patronizing, but you should read up both on probability theory (and its foundations) and on psychology. Also, ask your neighbors, friends or family how sure they are that it will (or will not) rain tomorrow (assuming it ever rains where you live). Then tell them that what they're saying is nonsense, since it will either rain or not, so "how sure" makes no sense. See how they react.
While it's clear from context that I think that the comments found the question confusing or the context it was situated in unclear, it's not really clear what was confusing, so there's not an obvious way to edit the question. The other close voters did not raise objections or give any suggestions.
In my view (which, admittedly, comes from a place of already being familiar with the ground tread by these arguments) the question was always clear, but after the edit to the title there should be no reason for its closure.
Secondarily, I think it's totally understandable to be confused by a question, but I think an enormously helpful thing close voters could do is explain, as best they can, their confusion, so that the asker or other community members can better understand what needs to be edited.
I'd appreciate if everybody could look over the question and explain any confusion, so we can edit it to be as clear as possible and then reopen it!
