That which is known does not inform.

David Haig

Don't think, but look!

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 66

One can’t settle issues by tossing a coin when nothing prevents the loser from repudiating his or her agreement to abide by its fall.

Ken Binmore, Natural Justice

Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is trustworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on ad infinitum.

Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians (trans. R.G. Bury)

夫言非吹也。言者有言，其所言者特未定也。果有言邪？其未嘗有言邪？其以為異於鷇音，亦有辯乎，其無辯乎？道惡乎隱而有真偽？言惡乎隱而有是非？道惡乎往而不存？言惡乎存而不可？道隱於小成，言隱於榮華。故有儒、墨之是非，以是其所非，而非其所是。欲是其所非而非其所是，則莫若以明。

Now, saying is not blowing breath. Saying has something to say. Only, what it says is never fixed. Have we then actually said something? Or have we perhaps never said something? If you deem it to be different from the twittering of baby birds, is there actually a distinction, or is there perhaps no distinction? How is the Way hidden that we have "genuine" and "false"? How does saying conceal so that we have "it is" and "it's not"? Where does the Way go but not be given? How can words be given but be invalid? The Way is hidden in "small accomplishments". Words conceal by flourishes and verbiage. This is why we have the assertions and negations of the Ru and the Mo, who confirm where the others deny and deny where the others confirm. If one wants to confirm where they deny and deny where they confirm, then there is nothing better than to use light.

Zhuang-zi (https://ctext.org/zhuangzi/adjustment-of-controversies 齊物論 4)